

2026 Directors' Remuneration Policy

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The Directors' Remuneration Policy (Policy) was approved at the AGM on 14 May 2026 and was effective from that date.

It is intended that approval of the Policy will be sought at three-year intervals, unless amendments to the Policy are required, in which case further shareholder approval will be sought. Information on how the Policy will be implemented in 2026 is included in the annual report on remuneration.

2026 Policy changes

Over the course of 2025, the Committee conducted a thorough review of the existing Policy to ensure it supports the Group's strategic priorities. Input was sought from a range of stakeholders including institutional shareholders, the main proxy rating agencies, executive directors and the Committee's external advisers, PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), to ensure a broad range of views were sought as well as alignment with market best practice and compliance with applicable regulations.

The Chair of the Committee engaged directly with a significant number of the Group's largest shareholders both in one-on-one dialogue and as part of a written communication programme and ensured the full range of those views were represented and carefully considered by the Committee as part of its discussions on proposed changes to the Policy. In total, approximately 60% of the Group's issued share capital were contacted on the proposed 2026 Policy.

The changes to Policy are set out in detail in the following pages. The 2026 Policy will act as a strong incentive to the current management team, who are well regarded by shareholders, to deliver our ambitious 2026 targets and to lead the Group through its next strategic cycle whilst also placing even greater emphasis on sustainable high performance and the creation of shareholder value. There will be a significant reduction in guaranteed fixed pay alongside increased variable reward opportunity further emphasising pay-for-performance. Underpinning this will be an increased weighting to financial measures in our performance conditions and an increase in shareholding requirements to ensure the executives are closely aligned with shareholder experience.

During consultation, shareholders expressed broad support for the proposals with no major concerns raised. Increased financial weighting and shareholding requirements were received positively. Shareholders continue to express their expectation that targets should be transparent and stretching which has been and will be given full consideration when approving targets for scorecards which drive both short- and long-term award outcomes. During consultation, it was heard, and acknowledged, that this Policy should last the full three-year cycle with no desire from shareholders to re-approve a Policy until the next on-cycle approval in 2029.

Benchmarking was one of the key discussion points during our shareholder engagement; from those conversations it was clear that our investors expected us to use benchmarking to test our proposals, rather than be led by it, and also to be thoughtful over our choice of peers. The approach which the Committee took to benchmarking the Remuneration Policy is set out in the Chair's statement.

While colleagues were not formally consulted on the Policy, the Committee ensured that the pay and reward proposition of all colleagues was taken into account in the process of developing the Policy and the People Forum was engaged to explain the alignment of executive reward to that of the rest of the Group.

No executive director has been involved in the determination of their own remuneration. To manage conflicts of interests effectively, executive directors were asked to step out of relevant committee meetings and relevant papers were also redacted for individuals if required.

Performance measures and link to strategy

The performance measures selected for the GPS and LTIP will be set annually by the Committee taking account of the Group's strategic priorities and its most important financial measures. Performance measures are selected to ensure an appropriate balance between short- and long-term strategic goals and to align executive director and shareholder interests. Rationale for performance measures selected and their link to both strategic delivery and wider stakeholder alignment will be shown in the annual report on remuneration for the year under review. In determining the appropriate set of measures and targets for annual bonus and LTIP awards, the Committee has discretion to vary the performance measures, or to substitute the metrics, over the life of the Policy taking into account the Group's strategic plan or emerging best practice.

2026 Directors' Remuneration Policy and Group remuneration policy alignment

The only significant difference between the Policy for executive directors and colleagues outside the Group Executive Committee is participation in the LTIP which is restricted to those most directly accountable for the successful delivery of the Group's strategy. LTIP awards are subject to forward-looking performance measures and are granted in shares ensuring a strong pay-for-performance link and alignment between executive director remuneration and shareholder interests.

The table below summarises how the Policy applies across the Group.

2026 Directors' Remuneration Policy and Group remuneration policy alignment

	Executive directors	Group Executive Committee	Other material risk takers	Other employees
Fixed¹				
■ Base salary	●	●	●	●
■ Pension	●	●	●	●
■ Benefits	●	●	●	●
Variable				
■ Short term incentive	●	●	●	●
■ Long term incentive	●	●	○	○

¹ Role-based allowances remain for Group Executive Committee members and certain other material risk takers. Executive directors are not eligible for a role-based allowance.

Remuneration Policy table for executive directors



Base Salary

Purpose and link to strategy

To support the recruitment and retention of executive directors of the calibre required to develop and deliver the Group's strategic priorities. Base salary reflects the role of the individual, taking account of market competitiveness, responsibilities and experience, and pay in the Group as a whole.

Operation

Base salaries are typically reviewed annually with any increases normally taking effect from 1 April for executive directors. When determining and reviewing base salary levels, the Committee takes into account base salary increases for employees throughout the Group and ensures that decisions are made within the following two parameters:

- An objective assessment of the individual's responsibilities and the size and scope of their role, using objective job-sizing methodologies
- Pay for comparable roles in comparable publicly listed firms of a similar size

Salary may be paid in pounds sterling (GBP) or other currency and at an exchange rate determined by the Committee.

Maximum potential

The Committee will make no increase which it believes is inconsistent with the two parameters. Increases will normally be no more than the increase awarded to the overall employee population. However, a greater salary increase may be appropriate in certain circumstances, such as a new appointment made on a salary below a market competitive level, where phased increases are planned, or where there has been an increase in the responsibilities of an individual. Where increases are awarded in excess of the wider employee population, the Committee will provide an explanation in the relevant annual report on remuneration.

Performance measures

N/A

Changes

No change to Policy on base salary.

To set fixed pay at an appropriate level in line with market standard for executive directors and further align executive remuneration with stakeholder experience, fixed share awards have been removed from the Policy.



Pension

Purpose and link to strategy

To provide cost effective and market competitive retirement benefits, supporting executive directors in building long-term retirement savings.

Operation

Executive directors are entitled to participate in the Group's defined contribution scheme with company contributions set as a percentage of salary.

An executive director may elect to receive some or all of their pension allowance as cash in lieu of pension contribution.

Maximum potential

The maximum allowance for all executive directors is set at 10% of base salary, which is lower than that of the majority of the wider workforce.

Performance measures

N/A

Changes

To set fixed pay at an appropriate level in line with market standard for executive directors, maximum employer pension contribution available has been reduced from 15% to 10% of base salary. This will move the executive directors from being in line with, to less than the majority of the wider workforce.



Benefits

Purpose and link to strategy

To provide flexible benefits as part of a competitive remuneration package.

Operation

Benefits may include those currently provided and disclosed in the annual report on remuneration. Core benefits include private medical insurance, life insurance and other benefits that may be selected through the Group's flexible benefits plan.

In certain circumstances, the Committee may provide additional benefits to individuals, which may include, but are not limited to, accommodation, relocation, and travel support.

Maximum potential

N/A

Performance measures

N/A

Changes

To align executive director remuneration package with the wider workforce where flex and car allowances were consolidated in previous years and to set fixed pay at an appropriate level, executive directors will no longer receive a flexible benefits allowance. Car allowance has also been removed as a benefit.

All-employee plans

Purpose and link to strategy

Executive directors are eligible to participate in HMRC tax advantaged share plans which promote share ownership by giving employees an opportunity to invest in Group shares.

Operation

Executive directors may participate in these plans in line with HMRC guidelines currently prevailing (where relevant), on the same basis as other eligible employees.

Maximum potential

Participation levels may be increased up to HMRC limits as amended from time to time. The monthly savings limits for Save As You Earn (SAYE) is currently £500.

The maximum value of shares that may be purchased under the Share Incentive Plan (SIP) in any year is currently £1,800 with a two-for-one match. Currently a three-for-two match is operated up to a maximum colleague investment of £30 per month. The maximum value of free shares that may be awarded in any year is £3,600.

Performance measures

N/A

Changes

No change to Policy.



Group Performance Share (Short Term Variable)

Purpose and link to strategy

To incentivise and reward the achievement of the Group's annual financial and strategic targets whilst supporting the delivery of higher, more sustainable returns.

Operation

Measures and targets are set annually and awards are determined by the Committee after the year end based on performance against the targets set. The GPS may be delivered in cash, shares, notes or other debt instruments including contingent convertible bonds. Where all or part of any award is deferred, the Committee may adjust these deferred awards in the event of any variation of share capital, demerger, special dividend or distribution or amend the terms of the plan in accordance with the plan rules.

Where an award or a deferred award is in shares or other share linked instrument, dividends or dividend equivalents may accrue over the vesting period and are payable in respect of awards that vest. These will be paid in shares unless the individual has met their shareholding requirement in which case they may be payable in cash at the discretion of the Committee. Where dividends or dividend equivalents are not accrued, the grant price of shares to be awarded may be discounted to reflect the lack of dividend equivalents.

The Committee applies its judgement to determine the payout level commensurate with business and/or individual performance or other factors as determined by the Committee. The Committee may reduce the level of award (including to zero), apply additional conditions to the vesting or delay the vesting of deferred awards to a specified date or until conditions set by the Committee are satisfied, where it considers it appropriate. Awards may be subject to malus and clawback for a period of up to seven years after the date of award which may be extended to 10 years where there is an ongoing internal or regulatory investigation.

Maximum potential

The maximum GPS opportunities are 300% of base salary for the Group Chief Executive and 250% of base salary for other executive directors.

Performance measures

Measures and targets are set annually by the Committee in line with the Group's strategic business plan and further details are set out in the annual report on remuneration for the relevant year.

Measures consist of both financial and non-financial measures and the weighting of these measures will be determined annually by the Committee. All assessments of performance are ultimately subject to the Committee's judgement, but measures will not vest if threshold performance is not met. The payout for threshold performance will not exceed 25% of maximum. The normal 'target' level of the GPS is 50% of maximum opportunity. The Committee is committed to providing transparency in its decision making in respect of GPS awards and will disclose historic measures and target information together with information relating to how the Group has performed against those targets in the annual report on remuneration for the relevant year except to the extent that this information is deemed to be commercially sensitive, in which case it will be disclosed once it is deemed not to be sensitive.

Changes

The maximum GPS for the GCE has been increased from 140% to 300% of base salary and the maximum GPS for other executive directors has been increased from 140% to 250% of base salary.

The Policy gives the Committee flexibility to permit dividends or dividend equivalents to be awarded on deferred awards.



Long Term Incentive Plan (Long Term Variable)

Purpose and link to strategy

To align executive directors' long-term variable remuneration with the Group's strategic ambitions, while ensuring alignment with shareholder interests.

Operation

Awards will be granted under the rules of the 2023 Long Term Incentive Plan, which was approved by shareholders at the 2023 AGM; awards will be granted in the form of conditional rights to shares in the Group.

Dividends or dividend equivalents may accrue over the vesting period and are payable in respect of awards that vest. These will be paid in shares unless the individual has met their shareholding requirement in which case they may be payable in cash at the discretion of the Committee. Where dividends or dividend equivalents are not accrued, the grant price of shares to be awarded may be discounted to reflect the lack of dividend equivalents.

The vesting and release of awards will comply with regulation and shareholder expectations, which is currently a performance period of at least three years, and a total performance and holding period of least five years.

The Committee retains full discretion to amend the vesting levels should the outcome not reflect business and/or individual performance including risk and conduct outcomes. The Committee may reduce (including to zero) the level of the award, apply additional conditions to the vesting, or delay the vesting of awards to a specified date or until conditions set by the Committee are satisfied, where it considers it appropriate. Awards may be subject to malus and clawback for a period of up to seven years after the date of award which may be extended to ten years where there is an ongoing internal or regulatory investigation.

Maximum potential

The maximum Long Term Incentive Plan opportunity is 500% of base salary for the Group Chief Executive and 450% of base salary for other executive directors. The actual award level granted will be determined with reference to a pre-grant test based on an assessment of performance by the Committee.

Performance measures

Awards will be subject to forward-looking performance measures based on financial and non-financial measures, such as strategic and sustainability, set out in the annual report on remuneration each year; performance will be measured over a period of not less than three years as determined by the Committee.

The Committee has the discretion to change the measures or their weightings, from grant to grant, subject to a minimum of 75% of the award being dependent on financial measures.

No more than 25% of the award will vest for threshold performance. 100% of the award will vest for achieving the maximum performance. Where performance falls between threshold and maximum levels, an intermediate number of awards will vest.

Changes

The maximum LTIP for the GCE has been increased from 300% to 500% of base salary and the maximum LTIP for other executive directors has been increased from 300% to 450% of base salary.

The minimum weighting to financial performance measures has increased from 50% to 75%.

To provide alignment to shareholders, the Policy allows for the grant of dividends or dividend equivalents to be awarded on deferred awards.



Deferral of variable remuneration and holding periods

Operation

Both the GPS and LTIP are treated as variable remuneration for purpose of applicable remuneration regulation.

At award, payment and deferral levels must meet minimum rules for executive directors. The current minimum requirements are:

- At least 40% of the first £660,000 of total variable remuneration and 60% of any excess to be deferred for up to four years with pro-rata vesting
- At least 50% of total variable remuneration to be delivered in shares or equity-linked instruments
- Where a portion of variable remuneration is delivered upfront and in shares it is subject to a minimum one-year holding period

Changes

No change to Policy that payment and deferral levels and the operation of any holding period is determined annually at the time of the award.

Additional context

To maintain flexibility across the period of our Policy, we believe minimum regulatory requirements is the most appropriate Policy position. However, we are mindful that additional considerations apply when it comes to executive director remuneration in the UK. We will set out our deferral position each year in the annual report on remuneration, taking into account shareholder expectations, market practice and emerging trends.



Performance adjustment

Performance adjustment is determined by the Remuneration Committee and may result in a reduction of up to 100% variable remuneration opportunity for the relevant period. It can be applied on a collective or individual basis.

The application of malus will generally be considered when:

- there is reasonable evidence of employee misbehaviour or material error or that they participated in conduct which resulted in losses for the Group or failed to meet appropriate standards of fitness and propriety
- there is material failure of risk management at a Group, business area, division and/or business unit level
- the Committee determines that the financial results for a given year do not support the level of variable remuneration awarded
- any other circumstances where the Committee consider adjustments should be made

Judgement on individual performance adjustment is informed by taking into account the severity of the issue, the individual's proximity to the issue and the individual's behaviour in relation to the issue. Individual adjustment may be applied through adjustments to balanced scorecard assessments and/or through reducing the variable remuneration outcome.

Awards are subject to clawback for a period of up to seven years after the date of award, which may be extended to ten years where there is an ongoing internal or regulatory investigation. The Committee has considered the time period of up to ten years and believes that is an appropriate length of time for performance adjustment to apply.

The application of clawback will generally be considered when:

- there is reasonable evidence of employee misbehaviour or material error
- there is material failure of risk management at a Group, business area, division and/or business unit level

Discretion in relation to variable rewards

The Committee retains discretion with regards to all variable rewards plans. This relates to:

- The timing, size and type of awards and holding periods, subject to Policy maxima, regulatory requirements and the annual setting of targets
- Where performance measures are used and performance against those measures is not commensurate with the Group's overall financial or strategic performance over the performance period
- Adjustment of targets and measures if events occur which cause it to determine that it is appropriate to do so. The Committee also retains the right to change performance measures and the weighting of measures, including following feedback from regulators, shareholders and/or other stakeholders; and amending the plan rules in accordance with their terms and or amending the basis of operation (including but not limited to the approach in respect of dividend equivalents) including in light of any change to regulatory requirements or guidance or feedback from regulators
- To exercise discretion in accordance with the rules, including in relation to whether or not malus or clawback provisions would apply, in connection with recruitment, or terminations of employment, or corporate events affecting the Company
- Adjustments required in certain circumstances (e.g. rights issues, corporate restructuring events and special dividends)
- The determination of how dividend equivalents should be calculated and paid

The exercise of the Committee's discretion will be disclosed in accordance with regulatory requirements.

Legacy awards and restrictions on payments

Awards in respect of the 2025 GPS will be granted in 2026 under the terms of the 2023 Directors' Remuneration Policy approved by shareholders on 18 May 2023. Awards in respect of the 2026 Long Term Incentive Plan will be granted following the AGM in 2026 under the terms of the new Directors' Remuneration Policy (the 2026 Policy), subject to shareholder approval of the 2026 Policy.

The Committee reserves the right to make any remuneration payments/awards and any payments/awards for loss of office, notwithstanding that they are not in line with the Policy set out above where the terms of the payment/award were agreed (i) before the 2026 Policy came into effect or (ii) at a time when the relevant individual was not a director of the Group and, in the opinion of the Committee, the payment/award was not in consideration for the individual becoming a director of the Group. Such payments/awards will have been set out in the annual report on remuneration for the relevant year and include awards and payments made under previous approved remuneration Policies.

Illustration of application of Remuneration Policy


The charts below illustrate possible remuneration outcomes under the following four scenarios:

- 1 The maximum that may be paid, assuming full GPS payout and full vesting under the new LTIP with a share price appreciation of 50% for the LTIP. The basis of the calculation of the share price appreciation is that the share price embedded in the calculation for the 'maximum' bar chart is assumed to increase by 50%.
- 2 The maximum that may be paid, assuming full GPS payout and full vesting under the new LTIP with no share price appreciation.
- 3 The expected value of remuneration for performance midway between threshold and maximum, assuming 50% of maximum Group Performance Share opportunity and 50% vesting of maximum Long Term Incentive Plan opportunity.
- 4 The minimum that may be paid, where only the fixed element is paid (base salary, benefits and pension).


Amounts are based on base salaries as at 1 April 2026, 10% pension allowance and private medical cover. Implementation of the Policy in 2026 is set out in the annual report on remuneration.

Value of package

Charlie Nunn (GCE)



William Chalmers (CFO)



● Salary ● Pension/Benefits ● Group Performance Share ● Long Term Incentive Plan ● Share price appreciation

Approach to recruitment and appointment to the Board

In determining appropriate remuneration arrangements on hiring a new executive director, the Committee will take into account all relevant factors. This may include the experience and calibre of the individual, local market practice, the existing remuneration arrangements for other executives and the business circumstances. The Committee will seek to ensure that arrangements are in the best interests of both the Group and its shareholders and will seek not to pay more than is necessary.

The Committee may make awards on hiring an external candidate to 'buy out' remuneration arrangements forfeited, or opportunities lost on leaving a previous employer. In doing so the Committee will take account of relevant factors including any performance conditions attached to these awards, the form in which they were granted (e.g. cash or shares), the currency of the awards, and the timeframe of awards. Any such award made will be made in accordance with the PRA's Rulebook and made on a comparable basis to those forfeited and, where required, will be subject to malus and clawback at the request of the previous employer as required by the PRA rules.

The package will normally be aligned with the Remuneration Policy. However, the Committee retains the discretion to make appropriate remuneration decisions outside the standard Policy to facilitate the recruitment of an individual of the required calibre in exceptional circumstances.

This may, for example, include the following circumstances:

- An interim recruit, appointed to fill an executive director role on a short-term basis
- Exceptional circumstances requiring the Chair to take on an executive function on a short-term basis

- An executive director recruited from a business or location where benefits are provided that do not fall into the definition of 'variable remuneration forfeited' but where the Committee considers it reasonable to buy out these benefits, or where the form of remuneration to be bought out requires a differentiated approach
- Transitional arrangements for overseas hires, which might include relocation expenses and accommodation

Variable remuneration awarded to a new executive director may not exceed the multiple of annualised fixed pay specified by the Remuneration Committee.

In making any such remuneration decisions, the Committee will apply any appropriate performance measures in line with those applied to other executive directors.

A full explanation will be provided of any buy-out award or discretionary payment.

Service agreements

The service contracts of all current executive directors are terminable on 12 months' notice from the Group and six months' notice from the individual. The Chair also has a letter of appointment. The Chair's engagement may be terminated on six months' notice by either party.

	Notice to be given by the Group	Date of service agreement
Sir Robin Budenberg	6 months	04 July 2020
Charlie Nunn	12 months	29 November 2020
William Chalmers	12 months	15 March 2019

The service contracts and letters of appointment are available for inspection at the Company's registered office.

Notice periods

Newly appointed executive directors will be employed on contracts that include the following provisions:

- The individual will be required to give six months' notice if they wish to leave and the Group will give 12 months' notice other than for material misconduct, neglect or other circumstances where the individual may be summarily dismissed by written notice. In exceptional circumstances, new joiners will be offered a longer notice period (typically reducing to 12 months within two years of joining)
- In the event of long-term incapacity, if the executive director does not perform their duties for a period of at least 26 weeks (in aggregate over a 12-month period), the Group shall be entitled to terminate the executive's employment by giving three months' notice
- At any time after notice to terminate is given by either the Group or the executive director, the Group may require the executive director to take leave for some or all of the notice period
- At any time, at its absolute discretion, the Group may elect to terminate the individual's employment by paying to the executive director, in lieu of the notice period, an amount equivalent to base salary, subject to mitigation as described more fully in the termination payments section of this report

Letters of appointment

The non-executive directors all have letters of appointment and are appointed for an initial term of three years after which their appointment may continue subject to an annual review. Non-executive directors may have their appointment terminated, in accordance with statute, regulation and the articles of association, at any time with immediate effect and without compensation.

All directors are subject to annual re-election by shareholders.

The service contracts and letters of appointments are available for inspection at the Company's registered office.

NED	Date of letter of appointment	Date of appointment
Sir Robin Budenberg ¹	4 July 2020	1 October 2020
Nathan Bostock	29 July 2024	1 August 2024
Sarah Legg	21 October 2019	1 December 2019
Amanda Mackenzie	17 April 2018	1 October 2018
Harmeen Mehta	5 October 2021	1 November 2021
Cathy Turner	11 October 2022	1 November 2022
Chris Vogelzang	11 June 2025	16 June 2025
Scott Wheway	26 July 2022	1 August 2022
Catherine Woods	22 October 2019	1 March 2020

¹ Chair is subject to a six-month notice period.

Remuneration Policy table for non-executive directors



Chair and non-executive director fees and benefits

Purpose and link to strategy

To provide an appropriate reward to attract and retain a high-calibre individual with the relevant skills, knowledge and experience, and to reflect the time commitment required to fulfil the role effectively.

Operation

The Committee is responsible for evaluating and approving the Chair's fees. The Chair does not participate in these discussions. The Group Chief Executive and the Chair are responsible for evaluating and making recommendations to the Board in relation to the fees of the non-executive directors (NEDs).

When determining and reviewing fee and benefit levels, the Committee ensures that decisions are made within the following parameters:

- The individual's skills and experience
- An objective assessment of the individual's responsibilities and the size and scope of their role, using objective sizing methodologies
- Fees and benefits for comparable roles in comparable publicly listed firms of a similar size

The Chair receives an all-inclusive fee, which is reviewed periodically plus benefits including life insurance, medical insurance and transportation. The Committee retains the right to provide additional benefits depending on individual circumstances.

NEDs are paid a basic fee plus additional fees for the Chair/membership of Committees and for membership of Group company Boards, non-Board level committees and/or other specific responsibilities.

An additional fee is also paid to the Senior Independent Director to reflect the additional responsibilities.

Any increases normally take effect from 1 January of a given year.

The Chair and the NEDs are not entitled to receive any payment for loss of office (other than in the case of the Chair's fees for the six-month notice period) and are not entitled to participate in the Group's variable remuneration arrangements, all-employee share plan or pension arrangements.

NEDs are reimbursed for expenses incurred in the course of their duties, such as travel and accommodation expenses, on a grossed-up basis (where applicable).

Maximum potential

Any increase in fees or benefits currently provided will be consistent with the parameters above.

Performance measures

N/A

Changes

No change to Policy.

Termination payments

It is the Group's policy that where notice pay continues to be payable after termination, it should be paid on a phased basis, normally mitigated in the event that alternative employment is secured in line with executive directors' service contracts. Where it is appropriate to make a GPS award to the individual, this should relate to the period of active service, rather than the full notice period. Any GPS payment will be determined on the basis of performance as for all continuing employees and will remain subject to performance adjustment (malus and clawback) and deferral.

Generally, on termination of employment, unvested GPS awards, Group Ownership Share awards, Long Term Share Plan awards, Long Term Incentive awards and other rights to payments will lapse except where termination falls within one of the reasons set out below. In the event of redundancy, the individual may receive a payment in line with statutory entitlements at that time. If an executive director is dismissed for gross misconduct, the executive director will receive normal contractual entitlements until the date of termination and all deferred GPS, Group Ownership Share, Long Term Share Plan and Long Term Incentive Plan awards will lapse.

Termination payments

	Base salary	Pension and benefits ¹
Resignation	Entitlement to base salary continues for full notice period. If employment is terminated prior to end of notice period, balance of notice pay is paid in monthly instalments, offset by earnings from any new employment during this period. If resignation is to take up a new employment, base salary would continue during any period of garden leave but may then cease if early release date agreed.	Paid until date of termination including any period of leave required by the Group (subject to individual benefit scheme rules).
Redundancy or termination by mutual agreement	Entitlement to base salary continues for full notice period. If employment is terminated prior to end of notice period, balance of notice pay is paid in monthly instalments, offset by earnings from any new employment during this period.	Paid until date of termination including any period of leave required by the Group (subject to individual benefit scheme rules).
Retirement/ill health, injury, permanent disability/death	Paid until date of retirement/death. For ill health, injury or permanent disability which results in the loss of employment, paid for the applicable notice period (including any period of leave required by the Group).	Paid until date of death/ retirement (subject to individual benefit scheme rules). For ill health, injury, permanent disability, paid for the notice period including any period of leave required by the Group (subject to individual benefit scheme rules).
Change of control or merger	N/A	N/A
Other reason where the Committee determines that the executive should be treated as a good leaver	Entitlement to base salary continues for full notice period. If employment is terminated prior to end of notice period, balance of notice pay is paid in monthly instalments, offset by earnings from any new employment during this period.	Paid until date of termination including any period of leave required by the Group (subject to individual benefit scheme rules).

¹ In certain circumstances, certain benefits may continue for a period post-termination.

Chair and non-executive director fees

Chair and non-executive director fees are paid until the date of leaving the Board in all circumstances set out above. The Chair is entitled to six months' notice.

Termination payments

	Group Performance Share (Annual bonus plan) ^{1,2,5}	Long Term Incentive Plan (Long term variable reward plan) ^{2,3,4,5}
Resignation	Unvested deferred GPS awards and entitlement to be considered for in-year award are normally forfeited on resignation unless the Committee determines, in exceptional circumstances, to treat as a good leaver, as set out below.	Unvested awards normally lapse on date of leaving (or on notice of leaving) unless the Committee determines otherwise in exceptional circumstances that they will vest on the original vesting date (or exceptionally on the date of leaving). Where the award is to vest it will be subject to the original performance conditions and time pro-rating (for months worked in the performance period). Malus and clawback will apply.
Redundancy or termination by mutual agreement	For cases of redundancy, unvested deferred GPS awards are retained and in-year GPS awards are accrued until the date of termination (or the commencement of garden leave if earlier). Such awards would be subject to deferral, malus and clawback.	Awards vest on the original vesting date (or exceptionally on the date of leaving). Vesting is subject to the performance conditions and time pro-rating (for months worked in the performance period). Malus and clawback provisions will continue to apply.
Retirement/ill health, injury, permanent disability	Unvested deferred GPS awards are retained and in-year GPS awards are accrued until the date of termination (or the commencement of garden leave if earlier). Such awards would be subject to deferral, malus and clawback.	Awards vest on the original vesting date (or exceptionally on the date of leaving). Vesting is subject to the performance conditions and time pro-rating (for months worked in the performance period). Malus and clawback provisions will continue to apply.
Death	Unvested deferred GPS awards are retained and in-year GPS awards are accrued until the date of death. Deferred GPS awards vest on death in cash, unless the Committee determines otherwise.	Awards vest in full on the date of death unless in exceptional circumstances the Remuneration Committee determines that the performance against targets set do not support full vesting.
Change of control or merger	In-year GPS accrued up until date of change of control or merger (current year). Where there is a Corporate Event, deferred GPS awards vest to the extent and timing determined by the Committee in its absolute discretion.	Awards vest on date of event. Vesting is subject to the performance conditions and time pro-rating (for months worked in the performance period unless determined otherwise). The Committee may decide not to time pro-rate in its absolute discretion. Malus and clawback provisions will continue to apply. Instead of vesting, awards may be exchanged for equivalent awards over the shares of the acquiring company or another company or equivalent cash based awards.
Other reason where the Committee determines that the executive should be treated as a good leaver	Unvested deferred GPS awards retained and in-year GPS awards are accrued until the date of termination (or the commencement of garden leave if earlier). Deferred GPS awards vest in line with normal timeframes and are subject to malus and clawback. The Committee may allow awards to vest early if it considers it appropriate.	Awards vest on the original vesting date (or exceptionally on the date of leaving). Vesting is subject to the performance conditions and time pro-rating (for months worked in the performance period). Malus and clawback provisions will continue to apply.

- 1 If any GPS is to be paid to the executive director for the current year, this will be determined on the basis of performance for the period of actual service, rather than the full notice period (and so excluding any period of leave required by the Group).
- 2 Reference to change of control or merger includes a compromise or arrangement under section 899 of the Companies Act 2006 or equivalent. Legacy fixed share awards may also be released/ exchanged in the event of a resolution for the voluntary winding up of the Company; a demerger, delisting, distribution (other than an ordinary dividend) or other transaction, which, in the opinion of the Committee, might affect the current or future value of any award; or a reverse takeover, merger by way of a dual listed company or other significant corporate event, as determined by the Committee. In the event of a demerger, special dividend or other transaction which would in the Committee's opinion affect the value of awards, the Committee may allow a deferred Group Performance Share award or a long term incentive award to vest to the extent relevant performance conditions are met to that date and if the Committee so determined, on a time pro-rated basis (unless determined otherwise) to reflect the number of months of the performance period worked.
- 3 The terms applicable on a cessation of employment to GOS awards are as shown on page 97 of the 2017 Remuneration Policy. The terms applicable on a cessation of employment to LTSP awards as shown on page 122 of the 2020 Remuneration Policy.
- 4 In the event that performance conditions are required to be assessed prior to the normal vesting date in connection with the leaver event, the Committee retains discretion to make such an assessment on such basis as it considers appropriate.
- 5 Any awards which vest pursuant to a good leaver event will remain subject to any applicable post-vesting holding period.

On termination, the executive director will be entitled to payment for any accrued holiday not taken as part of any period of garden leave calculated by reference to base salary.

The cost of legal, tax or other advice incurred by an executive director in connection with the termination of their employment and/or the cost of support in seeking alternative employment may be met up to a maximum of £100,000 (excl. VAT). Additional payments may be made where required to settle legal disputes, or as consideration for new or amended post-employment restrictions.

Where an executive director is in receipt of expatriate or relocation expenses at the time of termination (as at the date of publication no current executive director is in receipt of such expenses), the cost of actual expenses incurred or benefits provided may continue to be reimbursed for up to 12 months after termination or, at the Group's discretion, a one-off payment may be made to cover the costs of premature cancellation. The cost of repatriation may also be covered.

Audited content

All narrative and quantitative tables within the directors' remuneration report are unaudited unless otherwise stated. Where disclosures have been audited, this has been carried out under International Standards on Auditing (ISAs).